This chapter assesses the institutional consequences of the misalignment of representational arrangements in the main consultative forums for development cooperation, given the considerable shifts in the actual balance of power in the global order that have taken place over the past decade. The main finding is that the growing inter-state contestation between the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as rising donors and the traditional donors has resulted in three institutional outcomes: the modification of existing consultative platforms; the creation of new consultative forms; and the paralysis and decay of the established Gregory Chin and Jorge Heine
Introduction
The global aid architecture is undergoing significant changes. Broader shifts in the world economy are giving rise to contestation over ideas, norms, rules, best practices, and lessons learned about development cooperation between the traditional donors and the BRICS rising states, as well as changes in the institutional structures of the aid system. To date, there is still no consensus on the extent to which the traditional donors are actually declining, or whether their relative economic decline and the simultaneous ascent of the rising states signifies either a fundamental change in the norms and goals of international development or a fundamental evolution in international relations.
Nonetheless, it is tenable to suggest that other states have started to look beyond the traditional and Mexico. The overall outcome is a more complex and negotiated order for international development cooperation.
The growing influence of the BRICS countries as donors should not only be measured with quantitative indicators. As Richard Manning has shown, analyses based on changes in aid contributions do not allow us to see shifts in amorphous qualities of international influence (Manning 2006 ). This is not to downplay the quantitative indicators, especially given that the external capital contributions of the rising states have increased dramatically of late, but rather to suggest that it is useful to map the more amorphous trends of intra-and inter-institutional contestation in order to grasp the evolving structure of power and hierarchy in multilateral consultative forums.
The representatives of the BRICS states suggest that their cooperation is different from many other international and regional mechanisms, such as the G8. It is neither another new grouping of big powers nor a political alliance; rather, it focuses mainly on economic, financial, and development issues. The Chinese Ambassador to India has stated to the Indian press that "in a sense, BRICS countries act as advocates and practitioners in forging a global partnership for consultative forums as self-identifying members of "the South" and draw conscious distinctions between the traditional donors and their own approaches to development.
The rising states have taken it upon themselves to question the legitimacy of the established consultative forums for global policy dialogue and the dominance of the traditional powers in decision making for global development, and have pushed for reforms in some of the existing global consultative mechanisms for global development. On the other hand, they have also dedicated official energy and resources to creating alternative consultative forums for policy dialogue on global development and new development assistance arrangements. Whereas one academic observer has likened the scenario to a "silent revolution" in global development (Woods 2008) , other scholars have highlighted that the BRICS countries often play the "developing country card" when it suits them (e.g., at the World Trade Organization) while actually demanding a greater voice in other forums, which if achieved would move them into Great Power status.
1

Institutional patterns
In the sections below, we detail the three main institutional effects or patterns of multilateral change that we see in the consultative forums for development cooperation, resulting from the rise of the BRICS countries and their collective engagement and institutional contestation with the traditional donors: institutional modification, the creation of alternative consultation mechanisms, and institutional paralysis in the traditional donor regime.
Institutional modification: the G20 development agenda
In the multilateral consultative mechanisms for development cooperation, one institutional response to the growing contestation between the BRICS countries and the traditional donors has been the creation of the Development Agenda of the G20 Leaders process. The initiation of the G20 leaders' summitry process is one example of how the existing global architecture has been modified to try to accommodate the rise of the emerging economies (see Heine 2010) . We are referring to the modification of "Gs" leaders' summitry, the realignment of the informal consultative platform at the apex of the global economic governance system that was created by elevating the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors meetings to the Leaders level, and the G20 replacing the G7/8 as the key forum for managing the world economy, including providing guidance to the formal global multilateral institutions. In theory, one of the aims behind the shift away from the G7/8 and toward the G20 Leaders process was to give greater voice and representation to major emerging and developing countries within global economic governance.
Whereas the BRICS countries have actually experienced significant reluctance from the traditional powers to share power, the G20 Leaders process has given rise to a Working Group 4 on Development where one can see the influence of the BRICS countries in promoting a paradigm shift in global development. In the consultations around G20 agenda-setting, the representatives of the BRICS have been frustrated by the Working Group on Development (G20 WGD) discussion's being treated separately from the core agenda on "strong, sustainable and balanced growth," and sidelined in terms of priority for the G20 leaders' summits, and in the preparatory meetings of G20 finance ministers and central bank officials that pave the way for the gathering of Leaders. The practice of stove-piping the various Working Group discussions as distinct items on the agenda for the "Gs" leaders' summit was reinforced as a control device for the Toronto G20 Summit. For the G20 process, it has been hard to recover from the segmenting Chapter 51
Page 13 of what in reality are interconnected policy challenges to manage the world economy and promote global development.
However, within the G20 WGD, it has been difficult to ignore the concerns and priorities of the BRICS and the other emerging economies, given that the BRICS countries went into the 2007-09 global financial crisis in stronger shape than the advanced economies-the traditional powers-and emerged from the crisis earlier and stronger; while the crisis has also shaken belief in the preferred models of the developed economies (Chin 2011; Chin and Thakur 2010; BRICS 2012: 79-102) . Within the consultative processes of the G20 WGD, the BRICS countries and the mid-level emerging economies placed a premium on securing growth combined with an emphasis on "sustainability" and equity.
In the consultations for the G20 WGD that were organized by the South Koreans as G20 hosts in November 2010, the major and mid-level emerging economies championed a "return to basics,"
where the emphasis would be shifted back to promoting economic growth and ensuring national manufacturing capacity, employment creation, and infrastructure investment. Such a return to industrial developmental basics was seen as necessary for providing the bases for sustained national development over time. At the same time, the emerging economies also emphasized addressing the distributional question of "who gets what, and under what conditions" as needed to secure poverty reduction. In the consultations around the G20 WGD, the differences in the approach of the Asian and BRICS countries to the "pro-poor growth" strategies promoted by the OECD-DAC regime and the World Bank since the late 1990s became readily apparent.
The Korean and U.S.-based proponents who saw the G20 Leaders process as offering a venue to promote a paradigm shift in global development policy attempted to initiate the shift via the "Seoul consensus on development" issued at the close of the Seoul G20 Summit in November 2010. The "Seoul Consensus" consists of eight pillars: infrastructure, private investment and job creation, human resources development, trade, financial services, G20
platform for knowledge sharing, resilience and food security, and governance. The South Korean hosts of the Seoul G20 dedicated significant effort to shaping the global development agenda for the summit, especially the break from a "one size fits all" model, and to reestablish the principle that different models and experiences of development should be considered. To broker what many saw as new ideational and normative consensus on global development, South Korean development strategists and diplomats conducted extensive year-long negotiations with leading countries in the G20, the IMF, and the World Bank on the major agenda items for the WGD.
They also expanded the consultation process at the regional level, by carrying out discussions not
Chapter 51 Page 15 only with regional development banks but with other major regional institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union, Mercosur, and Caricom.
The most telling indication of the influence of the BRICS and Asian countries in the G20 WGD was the listing of infrastructure development as the first pillar in the proposed work plan for the G20 WGD for the Seoul Summit. In the final communiqué of the Seoul Summit, the details were laid out for the "Seoul Consensus" on development, which gave priority to infrastructure, private investment and job creation, and financial services-including a role for state development banks. In the follow-up to the decision of the G20 Leaders in Seoul in November 2010, and in preparation for the Cannes G20 Summit (November 2011), the French hosts announced in The French G20 presidency went beyond the preferences of many G20 members and expanded the development agenda for the Cannes Summit to the following four priorities: 1) strengthen infrastructures in developing countries; 2) ensure food security in the most vulnerable countries;
3) extend social protection; and 4) mobilize innovative sources of development financing.
During the preparatory meetings of the WGD at Cannes, a number of BRICS and other developing country members of the G20 noted that they believed that the French presidency was
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Chapter 51 Page 17 going too far in expanding the development agenda, and that it would only dilute the commitments from the Summit, thus negating any real chance to deliver on the commitments.
The lack of consensus from the G20 summit process on measures to ensure food security for the developing world and the limited follow through on the commitments made by G20 Leaders on financing for infrastructure investment were disappointing for the emerging economies. But in the end the Panel identified only a modest list of concrete regional initiatives that the multilateral development banks (MDBs) were willing to support-and that the G20 Leaders were willing to endorse. Progress has stalled on scaling-up of financing for infrastructure development for developing countries-a duty that was ultimately delegated by the G20 Leaders to the MDBs.
This outcome has been due either to reluctance on the part of the World Bank to undertake the assignment, or its inability so far to deliver on such a policy breakthrough, as requested by G20
Leaders. Chinese officials have noted that the World Bank has not gone beyond instructing African countries, for example, to rely heavily on global capital markets for infrastructure financing, or demanding that they make major institutional liberalization reforms as a precondition for the country to receive a loan from the Bank to finance infrastructure investment.
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The G20 Development agenda has also seen limited progress in securing policy breakthroughs on food security (Clapp 2012) , on extending social protection, and on innovative financing of development, despite the efforts at the Cannes G20 to include input from the Gates Foundation on the role of private-sector involvement in global development. It is reported that the Gates Report was dismissed by powerful BRICS countries, which are not as supportive of relying more heavily on private sources of development financing. Officials in Beijing caution that the move toward privatization of development assistance could be the first step on a steady slope where G7
donors try to shed their (public sector) responsibilities for meeting their international commitments on development assistance.
3
Creating alternatives: BRICS summitry
The contestation between the rising states and the traditional donors over development cooperation has also played out institutionally in a second outcome: the BRICS states, as a group of nations that have chosen to go "outside" the existing aid architecture to create their own multilateral consultative platform for dialogue, consensus building, and decision making on development cooperation.
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The BRICS countries, as a cooperative grouping, are beginning to receive more scholarly attention, although skepticism continues to be the conventional wisdom. Even though the academic world has been slower to adapt, the BRICS have caught the attention of the global media (Heine 2012) . The BRICS have evolved into a multi-level cooperative framework, with a leaders' summit as its highest form, and supplemented by meetings of senior security representatives, foreign ministers, finance ministers, governors of central banks, and members of think tanks, business circles, and financial institutions. The accession of South Africa to the grouping in April 2011 and its participation at the Leaders' Meeting in Sanya (China) signified an important development for the grouping, expanding the reach of the BRICS mechanism to cover the areas of Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas, and thus broadening its purported representativeness, not to mention its influence (Kornegay 2011 ).
The BRICS governments suggest that their cooperation provides a "valuable platform for the five countries to share development experiences and work together on development problems . . . to promote common development based on equality and mutual benefit" (Kornegay 2011 ).
BRICS officials also suggest that their countries also share similar concerns and views regarding the reform and improvement of global economic governance and relevant institutions. They claim that their intention is to make "joint efforts in meeting the global challenges" and "together
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to serve the common interest of their own as well as the international community at large." They make explicit mention of "working closely" within the respective consultative forums in the global development system, namely the "United Nations and G20," and note that their primary development concerns are issues such as "food and energy security, the Doha Round of trade talks, climate change, Millennium Development Goals and the reform of international financial institutions." They also state that they are "striving to increase the voice and representation of emerging economies and developing countries" within the global consultation mechanisms. We will return to the BRICS later in this chapter.
An important antecedent of sorts to BRICS is, however, the IBSA Dialogue Forum-the IndiaBrazil-South Africa consultative initiative which in many ways is turning out to be a "trial run" The strategic question for the respective IBSA governments is whether, under some variable geometry formula, there is utility for the BRICS and IBSA to co-exist as consultative forums.
Some influential officials in the leading IBSA countries have begun to question the relevancy of (Hainan Island), China-particularly as the BRICS grouping has proven to be an effective platform for encouraging a "comfortable but meaningful degree" of international coordination between the rising states and for gaining leverage vis-à-vis the traditional powers.
Returning to the BRICS, the rising states have used their own summitry as a consultative forum for development cooperation on two fronts: first, reinforcing their shared global public policy messaging within the structures of the G20 process and within the existing global institutions;
and second, and perhaps most important, the BRICS countries are using their own forum to work on shared development policy interventions, as well as to create alternative institutional arrangements of their own making (such as intra-BRICS trade financing and currency agreements) and pursuing the idea of a BRICS Development Bank.
On the first dimension, the BRICS countries are using their own summit to register coordinated messaging on the content and structure of global development. A review of the points of agreement in the Fourth BRICS Summit Delhi Declaration (March 29, 2012 ) that relate to global development shows the nascent collective voice of the BRICS. Whereas highly coordinated collective action on a wide-ranging and diverse development agenda would be a tall order for the a significant amount of intra-BRICS diplomatic consultation, and most important, a certain degree of collective political will that is shared between the BRICS countries. Moreover, the fact that the individual BRICS countries have already dedicated resources to host major international summits to back diplomatic commitments, and have committed to do more, adds further institutional reinforcement to the rhetoric of joint declarations.
However, in addition to working to champion their various BRICS causes within the existing consultative forums for global development, the contestation between the BRICS and the traditional donors, and the limited progress which has actually been achieved through the G20 process, has also led the BRICS to seek to create alternative institutional options that reside While financial industry analysts note that the idea of a BRICS development bank is long overdue, they warn that the bank still has a long way to go. They highlight differing state interests, and the need for some of the BRICS countries to avoid the domination of the bank by one member. Alexandra Arkhangelskaya, head of the Center of Information and International
Relations at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, believes the bank would be good as a framework for multilateral cooperation between the BRICS nations, but warns of the marginalization of other members by China in particular (Klomegah 2012) . In addition to bank governance issues, other unresolved issues include the capital structure of the bank, including the relative size of the contributions of each BRICS country in terms of the budget for the bank, as well as measures for ensuring that the multilateral bank is given the independence in project financing decisions, or at least the necessary room to operate effectively.
However, others-such as Alexander Appokin, a senior fellow at the Moscow-based Center for
Macroeconomic Analysis and Forecasting-point out that the bank does not need a lot of startup capital (Klomegah 2012) . The main ingredients are shared political will and a sufficient degree of collective action to enact the action plan that will be presented by BRICS finance ministers at the next Summit. More clarity on the establishment of the BRICS bank is expected to emerge from recent expert discussions in South Africa. The South African ambassador to BRICS, Anil Sooklal, has commented that experts from the five countries were expected to meet in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to outline the requirements of a bank and develop a possible roadmap to its establishment (Odendaal 2012) . Again, we see Brazilian diplomatic leadership as a bridge builder and initiator between the BRICS. Although to financial industry strategists the BRICS' alternative institutional arrangements may appear long overdue, the reality is that it takes significant political will, diplomatic effort, and resource commitments to create new institutions such as a BRICS Development Bank, and that this has not been a step that has been taken lightly by the BRICS states. In many respects, what the preceding discussion and the following analysis suggest is that the BRICS might never have advanced to an institution-building agenda if it were not for the obstinate response of the traditional powers and the traditional donors, and their failure to evolve toward the necessary degree of power-sharing in the key institutions of global economic governance and global development.
Institutional paralysis
In the traditional scenario, the OECD-DAC membership ruled. The regime of the traditional powers and the established donors has exerted strong influence over the entire global aid architecture. As the foundational scholarship on international organizations (of the late 1960s)
would predict, changes in such patterns of behavior have not come easily or swiftly. It has often been the case that international organizations, created under a specific set of historical circumstances, have continued to reinforce the structures of international power that were present at the time of their genesis; and that an international organization will often continue to try to perpetuate the original power arrangements even after the balance of power in the broader global environment has evolved significantly. These institutional tendencies account for organizational decay in the context of shifts in the world order.
Since the early 1990s, G7 governments and Northern donors had grown accustomed to setting the global development agenda. Together with the World Bank and the IMF, and as part of the DAC, G7 foreign aid agencies emphasized that developing countries should undertake economic liberalization reforms; this was also followed by promotion of a "pro-poor" model of 
Conclusion
The above analysis highlights three main points. Second, these representational misalignments, and the ongoing contestation between the BRICS rising states and the traditional donors, have resulted in three differing institutional outcomes:
first, the modification of existing informal platforms at the apex of the existing system of global governance, as seen in the shift to a G20 leaders' process and the outgrowth of a G20
Development Agenda with its own Working Group on Development; second, the creation of new alternative consultative forums, especially the BRICS leaders' summitry, as well as the IBSA Dialogue Forum; and third, the paralysis of the OECD-DAC regime, the established multilateral consultative forum for international coordination on development cooperation.
Third, no single multilateral consultative forum has yet emerged where the global community can effectively and efficiently make collective decisions on global development cooperation and where the delivery of those global public goods can be seen through to fruition. The differences between the multilateral forums in which the influence of the traditional donors continues to prevail, such the OECD-DAC, and the newly emerging consultative forums, such as the BRICS leaders' process, are more than simply about who controls the development agenda. These differences reflect deeper-seated divergences about the specifics of how to foster national development. Spurred by their own accelerated growth and having withstood the 2007-09
Anglo-American financial crisis better than many expected, the rising states see a larger role for the state and the public sector, prefer a less intrusive approach to policy influence (than the "conditionality" of the traditional donors), and place emphasis on sharing public policy experiences between the South (rather than the "one size fits all¨ approach preferred by the international financial institutions (IFIs) and the DAC).
It remains to be seen whether the current efforts to bridge these differences via the G20, as a consultative platform, will bring the results desired by its proponents. What can be said for now is that the debate between those favoring the various consultative forums for development
